Louisiana Law Review
Volume 25 | Number 2
Symposium Issue: The Work of the Louisiana Appellate
Courts for the 1963-1964 Term
February 1965

Public Law: Public Utilities
Melvin G. Dakin

Repository Citation
Melvin G. Dakin, Public Law: Public Utilities, 25 La. L. Rev. (1965)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol25/iss2/17

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXV

nance Corp. v. Holley,2 1 involving proven false representation in
obtaining a loan. It was initially decided by the court that that
portion of a loan representing a renewal could not be saved from
discharge since no fraud was involved in obtaining it. 22 The presumption was also indulged that the payments made by the bankrupt were intended to be applied on the new debt since, knowing
it would survive, he would have the most interest in reducing
it.23 However, on rehearing, the court's attention was called to
the 1960 amendment,2 4 which saves from discharge not only the
original debt incident to obtaining money or property by false
representation, but also any extension or renewal of such debt
where there was reliance on a false representation in making
such extension or renewal. 25 Such reliance was found present
8
in the instant case.

PUBLIC UTILITIES
Melvin G. Dakin*
In Morehouse Natural Gas Co. v. Louisiana Public Service
Comm'n, the Louisiana Supreme Court has presumably supplied the definitive solution to a problem case which has been
shuttling between Commission, District Court, and Supreme
Court for some three and a half years. The case is the relatively
unusual one of a profitable gas distribution property sold to
another gas distribution company by a carbon black company,
not in compliance with any order of a regulatory commission
to which it was subject, but in order to avoid becoming subject
to such regulatory authority. 2 The company was willing to sell
the property for a fraction of its alleged depreciated original
cost to accomplish this result and thus to lay the groundwork
for a handsome return to the purchasers if the rates could be
21. 157 So. 2d 376 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963).
22. In Guedry Finance Co. v. McCubbin, 120 So. 2d 298 (La. App. Orl. Cir.
1960), the renewal of an unmatured note was held not to involve property. See
cases collected in Comment, 21 LA. L. REV. 645 (1961).

23. 157 So. 2d at 379, citing LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2166 (1870).
24. Commented upon in 21 LA. L. REV. 638 (1961).
25. 157 So. 2d at 379-80.
26. Id. at 378.
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.

1. 245 La. 983, 162 So. 2d 334 (1964).
2. Id. at 986, 162 So. 2d at 335.
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maintained at a level such as to provide a return on the original
cost rather than the actual purchase price. 8
Since 1946, when the Commission announced that
it was
adopting original cost less depreciation as the rate base on which
it would test the fairness of a rate of return yielded by customer
tariffs, 4 its task has been mainly that of adjusting submitted
plant, property, and reserve data to a satisfactory "original
cost" basis.5 It has rarely, if ever, had to consider the side of
the coin here presented, where property devoted to the public
use has changed hands at a substantial discount rather than
a substantial mark-up. Had the community served been the
purchaser, the resulting windfall probably would have caused
little difficulty since it is unlikely that the effort to raise rates
to the extent involved here would have been made by a municipal
body. However, this was not the event and the Commission faced
a stubborn effort by the new owners of the public utility to reap
the rewards rather than the penalties of the Commission's
original cost approach.
In the 1930's, Pennsylvania was one of the few states which
voluntarily provided a return on original cost as a rate "floor"
for its private utilities ;6 the theory was so distasteful to the
utilities that it was resisted despite the escape which it provided
from the logic of a current reproduction cost which could yield
a rate base below original cost in those years of depressed
values. 7 The logic of the original cost method (or prudent investment theory as sometimes called) was spelled out by the
Louisiana Commission in the Louisiana Power & Light case'
as meaning that only the money invested in used and useful
property was protected against confiscation by the Constitution
and that confiscation was avoided if on such investment "the
investor [utility] is allowed to earn a rate of return which will
attract purchasers for his interest and allow him to sell his
interest and recoup his money invested." Morehouse is clearly
3. Ibid.
4. Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., LPSG
Order No. 4346, 65 P.U.R. (N.S.) 18 (1946).
5. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 239 La.
175, 183-84, 118 So. 2d 372, 375 (1960).
6. See Driscoll v. Edison Light & Power Co., 307 U.S. 107, 111, n.9 (1939).
7. See Dakin, The Changing Nature of Utility Rate Regulation: Just Compensation, Due Process, and Equal Protection, 36 TUL. L. REv. 401, 431 (1962).
8. 65 P.U.R. (N.S.) at 23.
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urging that it is this estimated original unrecovered investment
in used and useful property on which it is entitled to earn.9
In Morehouse, it was by no means clear, however, what the
original investment in property was, nor was it clear how much
of it had been recovered. Absent original cost records prior to
1942, an estimate had been resorted to both for the cost and
the depreciation which had been recovered. An engineer had
assumed an annual depreciation rate of 3% for the known acquisitions, but all property installed prior to 1942, of which
there were no records, was assumed to have been acquired in
1924 and to have depreciated at a compromise rate of 1.7%, on
the assumption that it should be fully depreciated by 1980.
Presumably, it could have been assumed to have been purchased
ratably over the period 1924-1942 at a higher rate and the result would have been little different. As to the post-1942 period,
when acquisition dates were known, the appraiser nonetheless
applied the same compromise rate of 1.7% up to 1960, after
which date a 3% rate was used. 10
Proscribed by the court" from other means of preventing a
windfall to the bargain purchasers, the Commission adjusted
the calculation so as to depreciate all of the property, including
the original property at a straight 3% rate, a calculation which
depreciated the entire original property in 33-1/3 years, or by
1957, thus eliminating it from the 1960 rate base.' 2 The Supreme Court now settles the problem by ordering the estimated
original property to be depreciated at 1.7% and the known acquisitions at a 3% rate. On this rate base, a return of 6% is
allowed.' 3 What a 6% return will mean to the new common
stockholders is not apparent since the security structure of the
company is not in evidence. However, as seems likely, the investment, some $34,000, was all made in common stock. If so,
a rate of return of 6% on an original cost (depreciated) rate
base of $165,000, as allowed by the court, translates into a return of some 30% on an investment of $34,000.
The Commission, as the agency charged with fixing just and
reasonable rates, was understandably concerned but unable to
9. 245 La. at 986, 162 So. 2d at 335.
10. Id. at 989, 162 So. 2d at 336.
11. Morehouse Natural Gas Co. v. Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 242 La.
985, 140 So. 2d 646 (1962).
12. 245 La. at 991, 162 So. 2d at 337.
13. Id. at 1002, 162 So. 2d at 340-41.
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counter the original cost argument. Perhaps the use of a
capitalization or investment rate base might have enabled the
Commission more plausibly to control the rate of profit in a
case such as this one. Justice Brandeis gave the classic description of the approach many years ago in a concurring opinion :14
"The thing devoted by the investor to the public use is
not specific property, tangible and intangible, but capital
embarked in the enterprise. . . . The investor agrees, by
embarking capital in a utility, that its charges to the public
shall be reasonable. . . . The compensation which the Constitution guarantees an opportunity to earn is the reasonable
cost of conducting the business. Cost includes not only operating expenses, but also capital charges. Capital charges
cover the allowance, by way of interest, for the use of the
capital, whatever the nature of the security issued therefor;
the allowance for risk incurred; and enough more to attract
capital."
The Commission, however, has not been consistent in espousing this approach and its success in maintaining judicial approval of a capitalization rate base was short-lived ;15 yet it is
constitutionally entirely plausible. 16
A case decided earlier in the term provides an interesting
comparison to the preceding Morehouse case. In La Salle TelePhone Co. v. Louisiana Public Service Comm'n, 7 a rate increase
case was also being reviewed by the court, again involving the
allowance of a proper rate of return on original cost less depreciation. However, La Salle is atypical in that it is capitalized
with almost 86% long-term indebtedness to the REA at 2%
and 14% common-stock and surplus.' 8 La Salle, while urging
that the 6% allowance which had been made by court and commission in numerous cases is applicable to it, nonetheless asked
14. Missouri ex rel. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 262
U.S. 276, 290-91 (1923).
15. Upheld in Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n,
232 La. 446, 94 So. 2d 431 (1957) ; rejected 239 La. 175, 118 So. 2d 372 (1960).
16. See Federal Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 315 U.S. 575, 607
(1942) : "[I]f the rate permits the company to operate successfully and to attract
capital all questions as to 'just and reasonable' are at an end so far as the investor interest is concerned." See also, Dakin, The Changing Nature of Utility Rate
Regulation: Just Compensation, Due Process, and Equal Protection, 36 TUL. L.
REv. 401, 436 (1962).
17. 245 La. 99, 157 So. 2d 455 (1963).
18. Id. at 105, 157 So. 2d at 457.
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for an increase in customer tariffs which would yield only 3.9%
on the property rate base because "this . .. is the rate which
its subscribers will bear without creating dissatisfaction and
impairing the good relations now enjoyed by La Salle."' 19 A 6%
rate of return on property would have paid the interest on the
debt and left some 29% for return on the common-stock equity,
' 20
what the court terms "an unacceptable result.
It is interesting to speculate what the result would have been
in the Morehouse case, had it been established that the difference between the actual cash investment of the new owners and
the net original cost ultimately accepted as a rate base had
actually been paid in by subscribers as excessive depreciation
to the old owners; the excessive reserve for depreciation could
then have been regarded as direct consumer investment rather
than indirect consumer investment through government loans
from the REA. Would the 30% return to the common stockholders be an equally "unacceptable result"? The speculation
underscores the unsatisfactoriness of a property rate base approach which ignores or pays insufficient account to the source
of the property or what is termed the capitalization rate base.21
La Salle is interesting also for the method used by the Commission to support its proposed rate of return of 3.7%. From
replies to a questionnaire sent to several state commissions, it
discovered that rates of return on a property base applied to
REA debt financed companies varied from 2-3/4% to as much
as 6%.22 Noting that consumer tariffs in effect would yield
3.7%, the Commission rejected the proposed increase. 23 The
court, impressed with the projection by the company of a continuing decline in rate of return from 4.1% in 1958 to 3% in
1960, thought it unreasonable for the Commission to adopt the
extreme lower side of the comparative range of returns which
had been collated, in light of difficult operating conditions but
acknowledged "efficient management"; the proposed 3.9% rate
of return representing some 15-1/2% on common stock equity
24
was hence approved.
19. Id. at 108, 157 So. 2d at 458.
20. Ibid.
21. See Dakin, The Changing Nature of Utility Rate Regulation: Just Compensation, Due Process, and Equal Protection, 36 TIL. L. REv. 748-50 (1962).
22. 245 La. at 109-10, 157 So. 2d at 458.
23. Id. at 106, 157 So. 2d at 457.
24. Id. at 110-11, 157 So. 2d at 459.
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The Town of Arcadia presented the court with a rather novel
problem in the review of rate-making activities at this term, a
problem made possible where a municipal body has franchise
power but not rate-making power. Thus, in Louisiana Gas
Service Co. v. LouisianaPublic Service Comm'n,2 5 the court was
called upon to decide whether water rate decreases, ordered by
the Commission in derogation of rates agreed upon between
Louisiana Gas and the Town of Arcadia, should be permitted to
stand. The franchise rates were part of an agreement pursuant
to which Louisiana Gas agreed to install additional capacity to
serve industry and afford expanded fire protection to the town
and were designed to assure a return on the additional investment thus necessitated. 26 Non-cooperating citizens thereafter
successfully petitioned the Commission to rearrange the rate
schedule and, according to Louisiana Gas, precipitated an in27
adequate return on their over-all investment.
The court found that the commission had the power under
the Constitution to modify the franchise rates pursuant to which
the investment in expanded facilities had been made by Louisiana Gas. 28 However, the court also found the subsequent
action of the commission arbitrary, unreasonable, and an abuse
of power and restored to effectiveness the original order and
franchise agreement. 29 The court concluded that Louisiana Gas,
despite the fact that the rates under the franchise agreement
were alleged to be the highest in the state, had "proved that it
required . . . annual additional revenue because of expanded
facilities paid for by it."3 The Commission had argued that
Louisiana Gas "did not sustain the burden of proof required of
it merely by proof of unusually high operating costs, without
an adequate explanation . . . for those costs." 31
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

245 La. 1029, 162 So.2d 555 (1964).
Id. at 1037, 162 So. 2d at 557.
Id. at 1036-37, 162 So. 2d at 557.
Id. at 1052, 162 So. 2d at 563.
Id. at 1057, 162 So. 2d at 564.
Id. at 1058, 162 So. 2d at 565.
Id. at 1040, 162 So. 2d at 558.

